In the aftermath of Ukraine's drone assault, which inflicted considerable financial and strategic damages and losses upon the Russian Federation, numerous sources conducted studies concerning unmanned aerial vehicles and their operational deployment. However, the main point of this work is ISO containers.
Containers, which signify a transformation in the transportation network, were devised to guarantee that goods/materials are transported securely and without harm when introduced. Solutions that greatly facilitate the management of space efficiency on ships have also been implemented, with processes being accelerated by the elimination of the need to repeatedly rearrange and reposition cargo to be unloaded at each port, as was the case in the past. These steel boxes, which number in the millions and are standardised under ISO 6346, offer military convenience in logistics and also pose a threat which requires examination in terms of the laws of war and international relations.
Containers and Military Uses
The military has relied on standard ISO containers since they first became available. The modularity, transport capacity and concealment of contents they offer provide users with strategic flexibility, making them a useful asset in a variety of situations. Standardised infrastructure makes features such as easy transport by trailer, train cars or special vehicles and quick delivery to the required locations possible, providing users with indispensable flexibility in the logistics. It is an irrefutable fact that, given the pivotal roles played by speed and logistics in the realm of tactical warfare, the contribution of containers to achieving tactical and strategic superiority is nothing short of paramount.
Naturally, in a manner analogous to the evaluation of each novel solution for potential applications in the field, ISO containers have also undergone evolution in diverse domains extending beyond logistics. The topic of weaponisation was bound to come up. The fact that its interior is concealed from the outside and its metal framework renders it resilient to environmental factors has generated fresh concepts, primarily for storage and subsequently for surprise attack factors.
Containers can be used to hide weapons or military systems, allowing them to remain hibernated for extended periods. These systems are activated by the energy stored in batteries, and they can be set to either autonomous, remote, or crew-assisted operation. This makes them similar to modern mines.
Armed Containers
The concept, which the Soviet Union used seriously in the past with special train sets to conceal ballistic missiles and gain the advantage of uncertainty through the principle of constant mobility, continues today in a parallel manner. Examples include Russia's 3M24 Club-K, which uses the Kh-35 (NATO Reporting Name: AS-20 Kayak) missiles, the container-based loitering munition concept by Rheinmetall, the towed sonar array by Atlas Elektronik, rocket launchers and other long-range weapons hidden in civilian trucks and containers by North Korea, activities by Norway for the NSM, container-concealed loitering munition launchers by Iran, the 120-millimetre NEMO mortar system by Finnish Patria installed in a container with 100 rounds, and work by the United Kingdom and China on weapons launched from containers. It is intriguing to note that this asymmetrical issue has been adopted by regular armies in both blocs. The issue will be discussed in more detail in the section on legal aspects.
The armed merchant ships of the past can be given a modern twist once again by hiding command and control infrastructure and energy support systems in containers. Even though they are not directly related, the aircraft operations of the United Kingdom from the merchant ship SS Atlantic Conveyor during the Falklands War can actually be cited as an indirect example.
Even though they are not directly related, the aircraft operations attempt of the United Kingdom from the merchant ship SS Atlantic Conveyor during the Falklands War can actually be cited as an indirect example. Thus, the threat asymmetry of regular forces now extends far beyond enemy lines, even reaching regions within the country, without the need for expensive strategic weapons such as ballistic missiles. Following Sunday's breakdown, it can be said that the warring parties have completely lost sight of the definition of a safe zone, even if the enemy does not possess long-range strategic weapons.
Operation Spider's Web
Ukraine initiated a major offensive using drones concealed in containers, targeting air bases deep within Russian territory as part of Operation Spider's Web. Various sources estimated that the cost of this operation, carried out with drones smuggled into the country hidden in containers, is equivalent to approximately 40 strategic bomber aircraft and several submarines. Aside from the financial implications of the attack, the loss of capability for the Russian Federation that will take years to recover is also due to the fact that the production lines of lost aircraft are no longer operational. The effectiveness of containerised weapons, which have long been evaluated theoretically, was demonstrated by systems being launched simultaneously using open source software. The roles these weapons could play in modern warfare were also highlighted.
Strategic and Legal Aspect
Weapon systems concealed in containers offer various advantages in terms of both logistics and the element of surprise. However, the legal aspect of the issue is where the main dilemma arises. Significant confusion regarding the concept of "legitimate targets" is caused by the use of civilian-looking vehicles and structures for military purposes. It should be addressed that using civilian means is not limited to Ukraine. TurDef prepares another report about the claims for Russia using telegram bots to remotely guide drones in Ukraine.
It is actually becoming more difficult to take precautions here, and this is something that should be taken seriously. The reason for this is that well-organised containers with concealed contents and disguised as civilian shipments have the potential to be easily passed through customs. Conversely, factors such as "persuaded port personnel" should not be overlooked. From a business perspective and in terms of the available time, it is not possible to conduct a detailed search on each container. It is crucial to recognise that any element that cannot be addressed directly through military action and possesses a civilian dimension can significantly elevate the threat level.
To give an example that isn't about the container, South Africa's Valkiri multiple rocket launcher systems, which are mounted on military trucks, have caused controversy due to their launchers being hidden under tarpaulins. Iran's weapons, disguised as civilian construction machinery and subsequently container-mounted weapons, make the equation even more unsolvable.
On the topic of Valkiri, it was a solution conceived to disorient the enemy by making them question whether it was simply a logistics truck or a formidable firepower unit. However, weapons disguised as civilian vehicles are elements that make it extremely difficult to distinguish between combatants, which is a significant challenge in situations where such distinctions are crucial. Consequently, every object observed by both sides of the conflict is regarded as a potential threat and is therefore liable to be attacked. The sustainment aspect of the issue is a matter of concern, which is already on the verge of collapse due to excessively high costs. Regrettably, the fact that every object observed constitutes a potential menace has resulted in a substantial escalation in civilian casualties in a war that has already permeated the city.
These steps taken to deceive the enemy are actually leading to a path that will force both sides to commit war crimes and put them in a deadlock. The dilemma provides an extremely suitable framework for the victim to be in the right when they are in the wrong, and the perpetrator to be in the wrong when they are in the right. This is something we see time and again. At this point, it is unclear whether the use of containers will be restricted or whether the definitions of "war crime", "legitimate defence" and "legitimate target" will be re-examined. However, it is clear that investments made in containers by both Eastern and Western countries, as well as by both regular and irregular elements, and their growing influence have reduced the likelihood of any restrictions being imposed.
Author: Özgür Ekşi
