Boeing announced at the Singapore Airshow that the planned purchase of the F-15EX Eagle II for the Indonesian Air Force would not go through. The announcement ended a process that had been unclear for more than two years.
The US Department of State approved the F-15EX program in 2022, but the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by both sides did not include any contractual promises to buy. A procurement plan that was revealed in 2023 called for the purchase of 24 F-15EX Eagle II fighter planes. However, Jakarta did not turn this plan into a final and enforceable purchase contract during the next two years.
In this context, the most concrete part of Indonesia's updated fighter plan is the addition of the Dassault Rafale. Indonesia has agreed to buy 42 Rafales from France in a phased deal, and the program is now clearly moving past the planning stage. The Indonesian Air Force has gotten its first three Rafale fighter jets, which are already in service and ready to fly. The deliveries are part of the USD 8.1 billion agreement between France and Indonesia. The wider supply timetable, which was disclosed earlier, will start in 2026.
Alongside the Rafale, Indonesia remains an international partner in Republic of Korea’s KF-21 Boramae programme. Although Jakarta’s participation has been affected by funding adjustments and renegotiations, the partnership continues to provide access to advanced design practices, industrial participation and long-term fleet development options. The KF-21 is increasingly viewed as a bridge between Indonesia’s current fourth-generation assets and future indigenous ambitions.
Looking further ahead, Türkiye’s KAAN programme has entered Indonesian strategic discussions as a long-term option rather than an imminent acquisition. Any potential involvement would likely fall beyond the next decade and depend on the aircraft’s technological maturity, export configuration and financing model. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s expanding defence-industrial engagement with Türkiye has elevated KAAN from a conceptual programme to a platform of interest within Jakarta’s long-range planning.
Indonesia has also left other options open that aren't from the West. Senior Indonesian authorities have said in public that they are looking at buying China's Chengdu J-10 fighter as part of their larger plans for force construction. There is no firm contract or delivery timeline yet, but the announcement shows that Jakarta wants to keep its strategic options open and its negotiating leverage, rather than committing to just one supplier group.
This diversification strategy must also be read against Indonesia’s existing fleet structure. The Indonesian Air Force's main fighter force is made up of 33 F-16 Fighting Falcon planes. It also has five Su-27s, 11 Su-30s, Hawk 200 planes, KAI T-50 trainers/light attack planes, and Embraer EMB 314 Super Tucanos. The way things are being bought now shows that there is an effort to slowly rebalance this heterogeneous inventory while lowering the risk of relying on a single supplier.
All of these changes show that Indonesia's defence procurement rationale is changing in a definite way. Instead of replacing one main supplier with another, Jakarta seems to be spreading political, operational, and supply-chain risk among several partners. The consequence is not a shift away from the United States, but a planned attempt to make it less likely that unilateral actions, sanctions regimes, or program interruptions will happen. In the increasingly competitive Indo-Pacific region, Indonesia's changing fighter portfolio shows a larger policy of strategic autonomy through diversity instead of reliance.
